Sustainability and Security within Liberal Societies by Stephen Gough Andrew Stables

Author:Stephen Gough, Andrew Stables [Stephen Gough, Andrew Stables]
Language: eng
Format: epub
ISBN: 9780415955829
Barnesnoble:
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Published: 2008-06-05T00:00:00+00:00

THE MINIMAL STATE

The minimal state can arise justly because majorities are entitled to act preemptively to prevent unreliable individuals and bodies from violating their rights (ASU, Ch. 5). Whatever one thinks of Nozick’s arguments for this claim, it is hard to see how it can be limited to the prevention of acts such as arbitrary vigilantism. The point here seems to rest on an interest basis, vital interest forming the ethical basis for intervention. The vital interests of a group of cooperators are threatened by the noncooperative behaviour of a minority. This entitles the cooperators to collectively force the noncooperators to cooperate and, in so doing, provides them with a form of compulsory compensation for their loss of freedom. Justification for this coercive move has always seemed doubtful in the context of Nozick’s overall position because the key element of consent from the noncooperators is missing (see, for example, Brown, 1986: 91–92).8 On the entitlement view of rights, one would be entitled to coercive rectification and punishment, not the abolition of chosen means of self-governance of a noncooperating minority.

On the other hand, voluntary self-interested cooperation also appears to Nozick as the first element to arise in the kind of naturalistic ethics that he endorses (see the Genealogy of Ethics, wherein it is described as ‘the core principle of ethics,’ p. 263).9 One might justify the cooperators’ coercive behaviour vis-à-vis the noncooperative minority in terms of rectification, but Nozick does not attempt to do so. In any event, it is not clear that noncooperators’ activities constitute a sufficient attack on the property of the cooperators to warrant such a move (and why this move rather than some other to ensure rectification?) The discussion in ASU assumes that this noncooperative behaviour is threatening because it leads to arbitrary attempts at rectificatory justice that threaten those signed up to the ultraminimal state. But there may be a large variety of different kinds of noncooperation that may similarly threaten cooperators. Other kinds of activity, such as environmental despoliation, poor sanitation, health-risking behaviour, and failure to educate their young to act responsibly, may all threaten the rights of others even when rights are thought of as entitlements rather than as needs-based. It is often difficult to clearly separate out a natural hazard from a man-made one. Given that the reasoning seems to be that the threatening of the vital interests of the majority appears to constitute prima facie justification of the violation of natural rights (although Nozick does not use that term), it is hard to see why this principle should not apply to the prevention of both natural and man-made environmental and health risks.

The minimal state, as described by Nozick, is a defensive organisation that exists to prevent rights violations. Nozick’s discussion suggests an assumption that only other humans can violate human rights. It is not clear why defence against natural calamity should not also be a priority. Further, while natural calamity is not always human-inspired, it is often ameliorable or preventable by human action.

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